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Current State. The Japanese economy shows no strong signs of 
recovery through early 1994, but some indicators are showing gradual 
improvement. 
Prospects for 1995 and 1996. Real GNP growth rates for the years 
ending March 31, 1995 and 1996, are expected to remain around 1% 
unless much stronger monetary and fiscal policies are adopted. 
Background for Current Conditions. One of the principal causes for 
continued slow economic growth is the aftereffects of problematic 
management of monetary policy which led first to the "bubble" in asset 
prices, then contributed to the rise in nonperforming loans, and 
subsequently has resulted in overly conservative bank lending policies. 
Other factors include the delays in formulating and implementing fiscal 
policies because of the paralysis stemming from the political scandals 
and instability, the slowness to make needed structural changes that will 
enable the banking sector to deal with bad loans, and the overvaluation 
of the yen. 
Revitalization of the Economy. One of the principal requirements will 
be to improve the effectiveness and timing of monetary and fiscal 
policies. Specifically, this will mean taking much more aggressive steps 
to write off nonperforming bank assets as well as formulating the proper 
level of fiscal stimulus and implementing it with the proper timing. 
Another major requirement will be to take better advantage of the 
strength of the yen. Many large Japanese companies have adjusted very 
adeptly to the rising yen, but this had been at the cost of putting a 
squeeze on smaller companies and restraining growth in incomes. A 
much more concerted program of expanding imports will be necessary 
to realize the full benefits of the strong yen. Otherwise, Japanese 
consumers, and by extension, companies, will face continuing yen 
appreciation and a squeeze on incomes. In parallel, a continually 
strengthening yen will raise the cost of Japanese goods to foreign 
purchasers, and much of the benefits of increased productivity in Japan 
will accrue neither to Japan nor to its trading partners. 
Improving U.S.-Japan Relations. If Japan takes the measures noted 
above to revitalize its economy, this will have a major beneficial impact 
on relations between the two nations. For its part, the U.S. government 
and American corporations need to examine much more carefully the 
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opportunities that are opening up or can be opened up for exporting to 
and investing in Japan. While significant improvements have been made 
in U.S. product competitiveness, much more effort is needed to break 
through remaining barriers that include not only various kinds of 
resistance in Japan but also the results of inadequate attention to 
investment in Japan by U.S. companies. 
Current State of the Japanese Economy 
The figures in Exhibit 1 suggest there is little evidence that the Japanese 
economy has entered a period of robust recovery, notwithstanding 
recent newspaper reports indicating the next economic upward trend is 
imminent. Gross domestic product (GDP) declined 0.6% in the October-
December quarter of 1993 because of further shrinkage in capital 
investment and in net exports of goods and services. This follows three 
consecutive quarters of decline in 1992 and a drop in the second quarter 
of 1993. 
As Exhibit 1 indicates, the strongest components of GDP are residential 
investment, public investment, government consumption, and private 
consumption. The rise in private consumption in the July-September and 
October-December quarters of 1993 and the upward trend in residential 
investment since the April-June quarter are the principal private-sector 
components where recovery seems to be in progress. 
Growth in real consumption has been fueled mainly by moderate 
increases in annual compensation of employees and the decline in 
consumer price inflation. As Exhibit 2 shows, however, even with 
recovery in the last two quarters of 1993, real private consumption on an 
annual basis has been on a steady downtrend since 1989. A major factor 
behind this, shown in Exhibit 3, has been the steady drop in the growth 
rates of both current price and real compensation of employees since 
1990. 
Developments contributing to this downtrend have included the 
deterioration in labor market conditions. As indicated in column five of 
Exhibit 4, the ratio of job openings to applications has dropped from over 
1.0 in 1992 to only 0.67 in January 1994. This is comparable to levels 
during the 1986-87 slowdown that followed the sharp appreciation of the 
yen. Similarly, the number of persons receiving first payments of 
unemployment insurance has also risen sharply over the past three 
years (Exhibit 4). Interestingly enough, as in past recessions, there has 
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Exhibit 1: Quarterly Movements in Principal GDP Components 
(1985 Prices, Seasonally Adjusted) 
Exhibit 2: Annual Movements in Principal GDP Components 
(1985 Prices) 
Exhibit 4: Indicators of Consumer Spending, Housing, and Labor Market 
been only a marginal increase in the rate of unemployment, presumably 
because of the practice of keeping redundant employees on the payroll 
as part of the career-long employment system. The percentage of the 
labor force unemployed in December 1993 was 2.8%, virtually the same 
as in the previous slowdown in 1986-87. Estimates of actual 
unemployment, including underemployed remaining at work, range 
between 5% and 6%. 
The three general indicators of consumer spending in Exhibit 4—the 
retail sales index, year-over-year changes in department store sales, 
and year-over-year changes in passenger car sales—all reflect the 
impact of slower growth in incomes. Retail sales in the last quarter of 
1993 were about 8% lower than in early 1992. Among retailers, 
department store sales have been most affected by the recession 
because of their greater emphasis on higher-cost luxury items, which 
consumers have tended to shun since 1991. Passenger car sales have 
also been seriously affected by the recession and continued to be down 
more than 6% year-over-year in February 1994. As some optimistic 
analysts have pointed out, however, the same three indicators show 
signs of moving out of negative territory, suggesting the beginning of a 
weak recovery. 
For housing investment, continuation of low mortgage rates, latent 
demand for upgrading of the housing stock, and falling land prices have 
been the main factors driving the recovery. As the fourth column in 
Exhibit 4 indicates, new housing starts have been the strongest single 
component of GDP in terms of year-over-year expansion1. 
A careful reexamination of Exhibit 1 suggests, however, that besides the 
anemic recovery in private consumption and the uptrend in residential 
investment, there is unfortunately little evidence that the Japanese 
economy is about to stage a strong comeback. 
To illustrate, nonresidential investment (private capital investment) is still 
declining, having fallen 4% in 1992 and then 8.4% in 1993 (Exhibit 2). 
The figures in Exhibit 5 do not argue for an early recovery in capital 
investment. The manufacturing production index was still about 10 
points below the 1990 level in late 1993 and fell further in January 1994. 
The same was true for the producers' shipment index. The producers' 
inventory index has declined, but remained more than 10 points above 
1990 levels in early 1994. The inventory ratio index ( based on the ratio 
of inventories to shipments) has shown little improvement and remained 
more than 22 points above 1990 levels. The capacity utilization index 
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Exhibit 5: Indicators of Industrial Production 
shows about 20% excess capacity on average for the manufacturing 
sector, assuming capacity was near full utilization in 19902. 
After strong growth through 1992, export expansion fell to only 1% in 
1993. Imports, after declining in 1991 and 1992, were up 3.2% in 1993. 
As a result, net exports now account for less than 1% of gross domestic 
expenditure3. 
The government has maintained growth in its consumption expenditures 
and substantially increased public investment expenditures. As Exhibit 2 
shows, government consumption was up 3.2% in real terms in 1993, the 
highest figure in several years. Public investment rose sharply in both 
1992 and 1993, reflecting the economic stimulus packages. These 
figures would have been higher if reports that many projects were 
delayed by the construction industry scandals are correct. 
Despite these government efforts, however, as the figures examined 
thus far suggest, the economy has responded only weakly. As the data 
on inflation rates in Exhibit 6 show, however, there is probably 
considerably more room for adopting expansionary monetary and fiscal 
policies. Wholesale prices are more than 3% below those of the prior 
year and consumer prices only about 1% higher. 
Prospects for 1995 and 1996 
Let us take the major components of GDP individually: 
• Consumption. The base wage increase for the spring of 1994 is 
expected to average about 3%, but cutbacks in overtime and bonus 
payments will continue, thus lowering the overall average. With 
consumer price inflation continuing at about 1%, growth in real 
consumption for the fiscal year ending March 1995 is likely to average 
under 2%. The scheduled reduction in individual income taxes of ¥6 
trillion will help to sustain the moderate upward trend in consumer 
spending, but this cut in income taxes is for only one year and the impact 
of the tax cut will be diluted by the scheduled increase in social insurance 
premiums, which will amount to ¥4 trillion on an annual basis, and hikes 
in a broad range of charges for public services, such as rail fares and 
communications charges. Some estimates indicate that the impact of 
higher social insurance and public service charges will actually reduce 
the income of households below the average annual income of 
approximately ¥7 million. Most of the beneficial impact will be in the 
upper-income categories where propensities to consume are lower. 
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Exhibit 6: Wholesale and Consumer Price Indices 
Growth in incomes and real consumption will probably not exceed 2.0% 
in fiscal 1995 and 2.5% in fiscal 1996, even assuming an optimistic 
scenario. 
• Investment. Some leading corporations have announced that 
their restructuring activities will begin to pay off in net income gains for 
the fiscal year ending March 31,1995. If so, this will put an end to a four-
year slide in corporate profits and may stimulate some recovery in 
capital investment. But the recovery may very well be quite weak. Excess 
capacity in manufacturing varies widely from industry to industry, but is 
estimated to still be about 20% overall4. In addition, private capital 
investment is continuing at an annual rate of more than ¥76 trillion, or 
US$700 billion, compared to the peak of ¥89 trillion in 1991. A rough 
calculation shows that, even at this reduced level, investment per worker 
is still twice the level in the United States5. Another point to bear in mind 
is that estimates of rising profitability are generally based on exchange 
rates of between ¥100 and ¥105 to the dollar. Appreciation into the ¥90s 
could erase profits for export-oriented companies and necessitate 
another round of cost-cutting and restructuring. Investment in 
commercial properties is gradually shrinking, as projects planned and 
under way in the early 1990s are completed. The current vacancy rate 
for office space in Tokyo is estimated at 8% (versus 1% in the late 1980s) 
and is expected to rise to 16% as projects in progress are completed by 
1996. A leading Japanese bank has estimated that excess office space 
will not be fully occupied until after the year 2000. A serious slump in 
construction activity therefore appears likely from 1996 through the end 
of the decade. Overall, private capital investment is likely to continue to 
decline about 5% each in 1995 and 1996. 
• Residential investment. The continuing demand for upgrading 
of the housing stock, low interest rates, and declining construction costs 
will sustain residential investment at a high level, but the real growth of 
3.7% in calendar 1993 will most likely decline to about 3% in fiscal 1995 
then rise to 5% in 1996. 
• Government current account expenditures and capital 
formation. Current account expenditures of local and national 
governments are expected to continue to move upward at between 2% 
and 3% annually. Public works spending would appear to have room for 
further growth given continued high savings rates and low inflation, but a 
variety of political and other considerations may intervene. Japan gave a 
loose commitment during the Strategic Impediments Initiative talks 
under the Bush administration to invest more than ¥400 trillion in public 
works projects. There are still many potential infrastructure projects in 
transportation and other fields that might be undertaken. With a 
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continuing shortfall in revenues, however, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
is not likely to alter its stance for restraining government expenditures 
and minimizing reliance on deficit financing, especially since its hand, if 
anything, has been strengthened by the recent political turmoil. An 
optimistic scenario calls for growth of 5% each in government capital 
formation expenditures in fiscal 1995 and 1996. 
• Net exports. Despite often accurate descriptions of closed 
markets in Japan, imports of goods and services in real terms in the GDP 
accounts have risen steadily in recent quarters and were up 3.2% in 
calendar 1993 versus a 1.0% gain in real exports. Barring any sharp drop 
in the value of the yen, this trend will continue, and the contribution of net 
exports to Japan's GDP will remain on a downward trend, exerting a 
slightly negative effect on overall real growth. 
These considerations suggest GDP growth of just under 1% in real terms 
for fiscal 1995 and slightly more than 1 % for fiscal 1996. 
Background for Current Conditions 
A number of developments have contributed to the current weakness in 
the Japanese economy and should be given attention in examining 
recommendations for fiscal and monetary policies. 
The aftereffects of problematic management of monetary 
policy from the mid-1980s. 
Exhibit 7 shows trends in the yen-dollar rate, Bank of Japan discount 
rate, money supply, and growth in current price and real GNP. Following 
the Plaza Accord in September 1985, the yen appreciated from about 
¥250 to the U.S. dollar in mid-1985 to ¥144 in 1987 and then to ¥128 in 
1988. This sharp upward revaluation of the yen brought a dip in real GNP 
growth from the 4.5% to 4.8% range in fiscal 1983 and 1984 to 2.8% in 
1985. Growth quickly recovered to 4.9% in 1986 and 5.9% in 1987. 
Industrial production growth took a deeper drop than GNP, from 8.4% 
expansion in 1984 to 2.5% in 1985, then to minus 0.2% in 1986. But it too 
staged a speedy recovery, growing 5.9% in 1987 and 8.8% in 1988. 
Despite what proved to be a short economic slowdown, the mood in 
1986 and much of 1987 was one of panic as the yen doubled in value 
and the profitability of exports dropped sharply. I vividly remember being 
taken to task when I opposed the consensus view that the Japanese 
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Exhibit 7: Currency and Monetary Indicators' 
- 13 -
economy was still in "free fall" at a newspaper economic symposium in 
mid-1987. I pointed to the improvement in industrial inventories and 
other economic indicators and to the absence of any significant decline 
in Japan's merchandise trade surplus. But the consensus view at that 
time was that even more aggressive monetary and fiscal policies would 
be needed. 
In reaction to what, compared to the last few years, was a mild 
slowdown, the Bank of Japan lowered its discount rate from 5.0% in 
January 1986 to 2.5% in February 1987. This was followed by a 
pronounced rise in new loans for capital equipment, a more gradual 
upward trend in total loan growth, and a rise in money supply growth, 
which had already been running above current price GNP growth since 
the early 1980s7. 
Surprisingly, this highly expansionary monetary policy had little 
noticeable impact on wholesale or consumer prices, apparently because 
the strength of the yen kept import prices low and no bottlenecks 
developed in any major industries. The impact, of course, was felt on 
asset prices. The index of land prices prepared by the Japan Real Estate 
Institute (based at 100 in 1955) rose from 5,481 in 1985 to a peak of 
7,674 in 1990. The Nikkei stock average rose from 12,565 in 1985 to 
34,058 in 1989, with one short plunge in October 1987, and price-
earnings ratios for the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
jumped from about 35 in 1985 to 70 in 1989. 
Equally surprising was the apparent lack of concern about the rise in 
asset prices. A Ministry of Finance Vice Minister declared his opposition 
to a tightening of monetary policy in his speech to a Euromoney 
Conference in late 1988 on the grounds that the Japanese people 
deserved to enjoy their newly found wealth. 
But as the president of the German Bundesbank, Helmut Schlesinger, 
noted in a conference in Tokyo in 1993, increases in asset prices of 
more than 20% annually are most likely a reflection of underlying 
problems, since few real economic factors can justify such inflation. 
By late 1987, however, the spiral had begun and inflation was feeding on 
inflation. Japanese banks—which usually insist on real estate or other 
collateral, such as securities, to back loans—fell into the trap of lending 
on real estate quotations that had little underlying economic backing. 
Real estate prices could be justified only by further appreciation. Price 
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earnings ratios averaging 70 and ranging up to 200 for NTT and a 
number of other companies could be justified only by expectations of 
further stock value appreciation. 
By the time this realization set in, the damage had already been done. 
The Bank of Japan expressed concern about a possible uptrend in 
consumer prices shortly after the introduction of a 3% consumption tax in 
April 1989. The discount rate was then abruptly increased from 2.5% in 
May 1989 to 6.0% in August 1990. 
This tightening of monetary policy had the desired effect but with a lag of 
about two years. Inflation in consumer prices, which had dropped below 
1% from 1986 through 1988, rose to 2.2% in 1989, to 3.1% in 1990, to 
3.3% in 1991, but fell back to 1.6% in 1992. Money supply growth 
dropped from 12.6% in 1989 to 6.9% in 1990, then to 0.7% in 1991. 
But this sharp and sudden tightening seems to have been undertaken 
without a full awareness of the implications. The word "bubble" did not 
come into common use to describe conditions in Japan in the late 1980s 
until about mid-1990. By that time, deflation of asset prices was well 
under way and irreversible. Stock prices peaked in December 1989 and 
entered a long, painful decline8. Land prices and rents in major cities 
were still declining in early 1994 and had already fallen between 30% 
and 50% from the 1990 peak levels. 
By mid-1991, growth in industrial production was beginning to slip, 
marking the end to the long period of prosperity that began in the latter 
half of the 1980s. Inflation in consumer prices was coming down, and 
money supply growth was well below 5%. But as examination of the data 
today—with perfect hindsight—shows serious damage had already 
been done again by problematic monetary policy. 
Apparently concerned about plunging the economy into recession, the 
Bank of Japan lowered its discount rate from 6.0% in July 1991 to 3.25% 
in July 1992. This had virtually no impact for the following reasons: 
• The overall economy was slowing; corporations cut back sharply 
on capital investments as they watched operating ratios fall and real 
estate properties come onto the market with no prospects for tenants. 
The Bank of Japan found itself in the proverbial position of trying to "push 
on a string." 
• As nonperforming loans rose, banks abruptly changed their 
lending policies and sought to restrain asset growth to meet BIS capital 
ratio requirements. Growth in total bank loans fell sharply from 10% in 
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1989, along with the credit tightening, but then continued to fall through 
1992 and 1993 even though monetary policy had presumably been 
relaxed (Exhibit 7). There was an even more pronounced absolute 
decline in new loans for equipment. Money supply growth continued to 
drop through 1991 and 1992, with absolute year-over-year declines for 
some months in the latter half of calendar 1992. 
• The slowdown in domestic demand led to a decline in imports and 
prompted corporations to seek to expand exports. The trade surplus 
therefore ballooned from US$76 billion in 1990 to US$134 billion in 1992. 
This, together with a decline in securities investments into overseas 
markets, contributed to appreciation of the yen, from ¥144 in 1990 to 
¥126 in 1992. Although hardly surprising, the stronger yen contributed to 
declining profitability and further dampened investment spending. 
Forecasts for economic recovery in late 1992 were revised to mid-1993, 
to late 1993, and more recently to late 1994. Pressures rose for further 
relaxation of monetary policy, and the Bank of Japan responded by 
lowering the discount rate from 3.25% to 2.5% in February 1993, then to 
the current historic low of 1.75% in September 1993. 
This and a series of fiscal measures, however, proved to have only 
limited impact, as we saw in the previous section. Corporations made 
further reductions in their investment spending and proceeded with a 
thorough program of cost-cutting and restructuring. Growth in bank 
lending hovered between 1% and 2% in the latter half of 1993 and the 
volume of new loans for equipment investment fell, even though the 
percentage decline became smaller over the course of 1993. With the 
advent of the Clinton administration's harder line on trade, as well as with 
continued large surpluses and reluctance of Japanese institutional 
investors to make heavy commitments to dollar-denominated 
investments in the absence of stronger market-opening measures in 
Japan, the yen has moved closer to the ¥100 to the dollar mark, further 
depressing export-sector profits. 
Political Scandals and Instability Slow Policy Initiatives. 
The seemingly endless series of bribery and other political scandals 
involving the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) finally led to the 1993 
defection of some members of the LDP and the formation of a fragile 
coalition. The coalition under former Prime Minister Hosokawa clearly 
underestimated the magnitude of Japan's economic problems and opted 
to wait and see what effect the previous fiscal and monetary policy 
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measures would have on the economy. Emphasis was therefore placed 
on political reform and other issues. 
For its part, the LDP failed to rise above the precedents for opposition 
party obstructionism set by the Socialist and other parties in previous 
years. Virtually any debate between the coalition and LDP clearly 
revealed LDP party members' single-minded interest in one subject— 
how to overthrow the coalition and regain power. The national interest, 
as represented by bringing an early end to economic stagnation, took a 
back seat. 
The bureaucracy appears to have gained additional power, if not status, 
because of the general confusion. This proved to be unfortunate 
because one of the early objectives of the coalition was to forestall what 
Naohiro Amaya described as letting the bureaucracy "go the way of the 
Kanto Army." This is a reference to the actions of the Kanto Army prior to 
World War II, when it took matters into its own hands and became 
virtually uncontrollable. As Mr. Amaya, a former bureaucrat, is well 
aware, one of the central problems of Japan's bureaucracy is its lack of 
clear accountability. The practice of allowing middle-level bureaucrats to 
move to director-level positions in industry has long been recognized as 
one of the principal obstacles to adopting meaningful market-opening 
measures and undertaking other reforms. Similarly, the de facto power 
exercised by middle-level bureaucrats has frequently made it possible 
for some ministries, or even bureaus within ministries, to make day-to-
day decisions that effectively oppose certain policies which a broader 
perspective would indicate are in the national interest yet are not in line 
with the narrowly defined interests of that ministry or bureau. 
A recent example has been the attempt at tax reduction undertaken by 
the coalition. Even though a ¥6 trillion tax reduction has been approved 
by the Diet, this approval occurred over the intense opposition of the 
Ministry of Finance, which has consistently fought against raising the 
fiscal deficit for any reason. To water down the effects of the tax cut, the 
Ministry has supported the ¥4 trillion increase in social insurance taxes 
and the sudden and broad-ranging set of increases in public charges 
that will essentially wipe out the effectiveness of the tax increase for the 
average household. 
The resignation of Hosokawa, in part because of undisclosed financial 
indiscretions and in part because of the related delay in passing the 
budget, suggests that confusion and lack of direction in the political 
sphere continues to detract from prospects for more aggressive policies 
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to deal with the economic slowdown. 
Other issues 
Other problems that have exerted a braking effect on recovery in Japan, 
some of which have been touched on briefly in previous pages, include 
the following: 
• The slow approach to dealing with nonperforming loans. 
Securities analysts following Japan's banking industry estimate that 
nonperforming loans, under the definition used in the United States and 
much of Europe, are probably about three times the level currently 
disclosed9. This is because banks in Japan need not report loans as 
nonperforming until interest and principal are six months in arrears, as 
opposed to three months elsewhere. Similarly, Japanese banks are not 
required to list loans for which interest has been temporarily reduced or 
eliminated. Disclosure of loans to nonbanking financial institutions that in 
turn have large nonperforming loan portfolios is also not required, 
provided loans to nonbanks themselves are not in arrears. This implies 
that the currently disclosed volume of about ¥14 trillion, or US$140 
billion, in nonperforming loans for the largest 21 banks is probably in 
excess of US$400 billion. Even though some writeoffs have been taken 
and some bad loans sold to the Cooperative Loan Purchasing 
Corporation,10 the outstanding volume as of March 31,1994, was 
virtually unchanged from a year earlier. The large volume of 
nonperforming loans continues to act as a damper on bank loan growth. 
• The overvaluation of the yen. It is fashionable in Japan today 
to link the present high value of the yen with the policies of the Clinton 
administration. In some circles, Fred Bergsten has apparently gained the 
status of something approaching an archfiend among undesirable 
foreigners because his pronouncements about the value of the yen have 
apparently had some influence on the yen's value. But tracing the cause 
of the strong yen to the statements of politicians and others in the United 
States conveniently ignores the massive trade surplus, the lack of 
forceful action toward market opening, and the consequent reluctance of 
life insurance companies and other institutional investors to commit 
more funds to dollar assets. Granted that members of the Clinton 
administration and Fred Bergsten may have been influential in moving 
the yen from ¥110 to ¥105, this fails to account for the remaining ¥90-
plus gap between recent yen-dollar exchange rates and the ¥200 to the 
dollar level that the Economic Planning Agency and other sources 
estimate as the parity yen-dollar rate. 
- 18 -
Revitalizing the Economy 
Improve Effectiveness and Timing of Monetary and Fiscal 
Policies 
One of the most urgent requirements is to end the political turmoil and 
enact more effective monetary and fiscal policies. In monetary policy, 
one of the most important tasks is for government authorities to 
encourage banks to mark their nonperforming loans to market value, 
write off bad loans more rapidly, and assume a more liberal lending 
stance11. Even though banks argue that low growth in lending is a result 
of the lack of creditworthy projects and borrowers, the historically low 
rates of growth in bank lending in recent quarters suggest this is 
probably not the only explanation. If U.S. experience is any guide, banks 
will alter their lending policies substantially when they are clearly on the 
way to solving the nonperforming loan problem even though they may 
not have completely eliminated all nonperforming assets. 
In fiscal policy, the key task will be to create incentives for the Ministry of 
Finance to act less like the Kanto Army and allow more flexible use of 
fiscal stimulus. With this greater leeway, the government should enact a 
much larger program of public works to augment Japan's infrastructure. 
Subsidiary measures would be to encourage the electric power 
companies to step up their investments and to create incentives for NTT 
and the new private telephone companies to accelerate investments in 
the information highway, an area where Japan lags behind the United 
States. Other measures to consider would be extending the cut in 
income taxes for several more years and not watering down its 
effectiveness by raising other public charges. 
These steps would confirm the willingness and capabilities of Japan's 
government sector to act in line with not only its own long-term interests 
but also the interests of the goals agreed upon by the international 
community. 
Take Better Advantage of the Strong Yen 
As noted above, the yen appears to be seriously overvalued when 
measured by international purchasing power. Yet, as many in the United 
States and elsewhere have pointed out, if the yen remains strong, 
eventually imports will rise and the surplus will be reduced. This point of 
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view, of course, assumes many things about corporate and public-sector 
behavior. Most importantly, it assumes that Japan is a free market 
economy operating along U.S. and European lines and that corporations 
are in business to maximize their profits with a fairly short-term planning 
horizon. If it is the case that currency adjustments will bring adjustment in 
international payments imbalances, why, as Exhibit 8 shows, has a 
doubling in the value of the yen since mid-1985, nearly a decade ago, 
resulted in a ballooning of Japan's trade surplus instead of a reduction? 
To show why this view of Japan as a market economy that will undergo 
balance of payments adjustments according to the theory of floating 
exchange rates is wide of the mark, let us review carefully the 
adjustment process that Japan has undergone in dealing with the 
stronger yen. 
Japan's Adjustment to Currency Appreciation 
In an open, free market economy in which companies maximize profits 
with a time horizon of several quarters and are free to hire and fire 
resources from a pool at market prices, currency appreciation would 
probably have the following effects: 
• Corporations unable to compete in export markets in certain 
product lines would exit or sell these businesses or move them to lower-
cost countries and either downsize or reallocate resources to lines 
where they can be competitive. 
• If unable to undertake this resource allocation process rapidly 
enough, companies would probably be forced to go out of business. 
• In making decisions, corporate managements would be painfully 
aware of the views of stock analysts and shareholders. Failure to exit 
unprofitable businesses or move quickly enough to reallocate resources 
would lead to a drop in stock prices, a drop in the personal wealth of 
management owning stock in their companies, and possibly an 
unfriendly takeover. 
Managements at corporations in Japan find themselves with a 
significantly different set of concerns. For example, the pecking order of 
shareholders, management, and employees prevailing in the United 
States and Europe is almost reversed in Japan. Shareholders, especially 
individual shareholders, are the least important group. Employees and 
their continued well-being come first. What difference does this make in 
the outcome? 
For Japanese companies, the first response under yen appreciation has 
not been to exit businesses because of low profitability. Instead the 
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Exhibit 8: Currency, Trade, and Capital Flow Indicators12 
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highest priority goals have been to 
• Survive. Take all measures necessary to ensure the continuation 
of the company, even if profitability suffers for several years. 
• Keep the value added at home. Do not exit a business until all 
possibilities have been exhausted for cutting costs, raising efficiency, 
sourcing certain parts offshore in lower-cost countries, forcing domestic 
suppliers to cut their costs, and upgrading the features and value added 
of domestically manufactured products to enhance their perceived 
value. 
• Maintain or increase export market share. Since a high 
percentage of costs are fixed, because of career-long employment at 
home, sell at or below cost in export markets to maintain operating rates. 
• Keep sophisticated manufacturing knowhow at home. When 
conditions have stabilized, continue to target new, high-value-added 
products and manufacture as many as possible of these internally or in 
your group of companies to make sure that manufacturing experience is 
retained and that quality standards can be met. Be reluctant to source 
externally, but when doing so aim to master the outside suppliers' skills 
as quickly as possible. 
From a slightly different perspective, the adjustment mechanism 
employed by Japanese manufacturing companies during periods of yen 
appreciation can be outlined as follows: 
• Take full advantage of lower imported raw material costs by 
renegotiating contracts as quickly as possible. 
• Invest in lower-cost overseas facilities to provide the more labor-
intensive parts and assembly services. 
• Cut or restrain wage costs by keeping company-based union 
demands low, minimizing new hirings, letting natural attrition (of about 
5%) take its course, using early retirement bonuses to buy out older 
staff, assigning high-wage senior personnel to subsidiaries and affiliates 
at substantially reduced compensation, reducing overtime, and cutting 
back on part-time and contract employees. 
• Cut production costs through high levels of investment in 
automated facilities. 
• Require all subcontractors and suppliers to go through similar 
cost-cutting procedures; cease to use those who cannot comply. 
• Constantly redesign products to attain higher actual and 
perceived value added. 
• Sell at or below costs in overseas markets while maintaining a 
premium on domestic sales. 
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This process has enabled Japan to adjust to the appreciation of the yen. 
As the yen has gained in value, exports in value and volume terms and 
the trade surplus, with some ups and downs, have grown larger and 
larger. 
Factors Restraining Import Growth 
In addition to the adjustment process by Japanese companies described 
above, the other piece to the puzzle of rising surpluses is what happens 
on the import side. The key data regarding imports and exports are 
shown in Exhibit 9. In summary, growth in imports on an IMF basis, as 
shown in Exhibit 8 has dropped below the levels prevailing in the late 
1980s. As Exhibit 9 indicates, imports in dollar terms on a customs 
clearance basis were virtually level from 1990 through 1992, then 
expanded in 1993. In contrast, exports have been expanding between 
US$10 billion and US$20 billion annually. This divergence has been just 
as pronounced, if not more so, in yen terms. In volume terms, growth in 
imports from 1987 to 1993 was higher than in exports. 
When Herbert Hax, professor of Koln University and chairman of the 
German Council of Economic Experts, was asked following a speech in 
Tokyo recently how Germany managed to conduct its economic affairs 
so harmoniously with the United States and other countries, without 
trade altercations, he pointed to certain key differences: 
• While the mark has appreciated and Germany has frequently 
recorded surpluses, these have not been so heavily concentrated with 
the United States, and Germany has also recorded current account 
deficits, for example, in 1992 and 1993. 
• Germany's trade is characterized by a higher percentage of intra-
industry trade than Japan's. In other words, in any given industrial 
category, such as machine tools, Germany manufactures certain types 
and imports other types. 
The structure of Germany's trade is probably not the consequence of 
hands-on economic management, since alternative surpluses and 
deficits as well as significant intra-industry trade appear to be the norm 
for industrialized countries. This results from competition among 
domestic and foreign companies, with the more competitive industries 
and companies winning and the less competitive ones being replaced. 
Over the past 20 years, we at IBI have written reports on a broad 
spectrum of Japanese industries and have a few generalizations I would 
like to share that may shed some light on the differences between 
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Exhibit 9: Trends in Trade Volumes and Values 
Japan's trading behavior and that of other industrialized countries: 
• Japan has had and continues to have an industrial policy which 
encourages companies to move into increasingly higher-value-added 
industries and products. This general thrust of industrial development is 
not unique to Japan, but details of the development process noticeably 
differ from those in the United States in particular in a number of 
respects, including the means employed to overcome such barriers as 
high initial entry costs and other externalities. 
• The fundamental mind set in Japan is often described in 
Japanese as jimae shugi, implying that undertaking production 
domestically, as opposed to importing, is preferable even if initial costs 
are higher. The typical behavior pattern of Japanese corporations is 
therefore to (a) buy new technologies when these are available from 
foreign corporations and when they are not, invent around them; (b) 
adapt features and services carefully to Japanese user requirements; 
and (c) move down the manufacturing learning curve as quickly as 
possible to achieve cost advantages and achieve dominance first in the 
domestic market and then overseas. 
• Government ministries are fully in agreement with this approach 
and orchestrate, when needed, many forms of assistance to promote 
the development of new, high-value-added industries. This includes 
encouraging financial institutions to provide long-term loans, organizing 
joint research consortia, and keeping a close watch on foreign 
competition to be sure that their activities provide a competitive stimulus 
but remain essentially confined to an easily controllable niche. 
For readers interested in pursuing this subject in greater detail, I 
recommend two publications of the American Chamber of Commerce in 
Japan: Trade and Investment in Japan: The Current Environment, 1991 
and United States-Japan Trade White Paper, published annually. These 
two books set out many of the remaining problems in expanding exports 
to and direct investments in Japan. While much progress has been made 
over the last two decades, as one investment banker put recently, 
"Alright, I agree we have a level playing field now. But unfortunately, 
there are these incredibly dense patches of fog that suddenly appear 
just as we are about to kick the ball for a winning goal." 
The Outcome: Surpluses Persist and the Yen Rises 
The principal outcomes of Japan's approach to economic management 
are that Japanese industries tend to become competitive across a wide 
range of products, leaving only some niche markets for foreign 
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competitors. This combination of industrial policy and strategy and 
effective restraints on imports of higher value added manufactured 
products appears to account for much of the difference between the 
trade structures of Japan and Germany: 
• Japan chronically runs a merchandise trade surplus. 
• The market share of foreign companies in many medium-to-high-
technology sectors is considerably lower than in other industrialized 
countries. 
As a consequence of these and other factors, Japan experiences 
upward pressure on its currency. The pattern which began in the early 
1970s, is familiar: 
• Japan implements its industrial policy, becoming internationally 
competitive in a broader range of higher-value-added industries. 
• Imports also rise but generally fail to keep pace with the growth in 
exports. 
• The merchandise trade surplus expands, leading to pressures for 
upward revaluation of the yen. 
• The yen strengthens against the dollar and other currencies, and 
Japanese products temporarily lose their competitiveness. 
• But through the adjustment process described earlier, involving 
such measures as increasing capital investment to automate production 
processes, upgrading product features, cutting costs, moving some 
production offshore, and requiring subcontractors and other suppliers to 
go through a similar slimming down exercise, Japanese corporations 
typically regain their competitive edge and export growth recovers. 
• Again, however, the growth in imports tends to lag that of exports, 
not only because of built-in resistances but also because raw material 
imports, ceteris paribus, are cheaper because of the stronger yen. 
• The trade surplus rises and pressures for yen appreciation grow 
again. 
Presumably this process cannot continue forever. Some of the problems 
already evident are as follows: 
• Even though leading companies have begun to indulge in self-
congratulation about the success of their "restructuring," some of this 
success has been achieved at the cost of reduced wages in smaller 
companies that supply these companies. The Shoko Chukin Bank, for 
example, released a report in mid-April indicating that while a gradual 
upward trend appeared to be emerging in the Japanese economy as a 
whole, recovery among smaller companies would be delayed at least 
several quarters. 
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• Further yen appreciation will place pressures on leading 
corporations again as well as on smaller companies, thus bringing 
further deflationary pressures and delaying the recovery. 
• The growing number of Japanese factories overseas will very 
likely lead to a leakage of manufacturing and other forms of knowhow, 
thus hastening the closing of the gap between Japan and the 
industrializing countries. This process has certain very positive aspects, 
as it is bringing rising incomes in the developing countries. But from the 
point of view of corporate strategy, the issues are what forms of 
knowhow should be transferred and how quickly. The process described 
above has, to a very real extent, taken the decision-making power on 
these two strategy issues partially out of the hands of corporations. 
• The continued growth in the purchasing power of the yen 
overseas (but not domestically), while a great boon for those with the 
time to take trips overseas and for consumers of those items that have 
actually dropped in price, is not really reflected for the most part in the 
areas where the standard of living in Japan is most in need of 
improvement. The awareness of this issue in Japan is still not very great 
because, as one economist puts it, "Even with the recession, the 
Japanese people as a whole are still probably better off than they have 
been since the beginning of their history." 
• A more recent problem is the growing loss of value of securities 
and other overseas investments as yen appreciation continues. 
Institutional investors in Japan are reportedly already sitting on large 
undisclosed losses on U. S. bond investments. This is a key factor in 
restraining their activity in recycling the dollars that Japan is earning from 
exports. Unfortunately, this is also a destabilizing factor, tending to push 
the yen higher. 
In other words, Japan is not taking full advantage of the appreciation of 
the yen. At the same time, yen appreciation is also working to the 
disadvantage of overseas consumers. Japanese corporations spend 
enormous sums of money on capital investment and implement other 
measures to become more competitive. Since this additional value is not 
used to the extent it might be in purchasing imports and bringing the 
benefits of improved terms of trade to Japan, the yen appreciates and 
Japanese companies must raise their prices in overseas markets. 
In the most recent adjustment phase, Japanese workers have been 
obliged to try even harder but at reduced wages as the yen appreciates. 
At the same time, overseas consumers are obliged to pay higher prices 
for Japanese goods. This appears to be a lose-lose situation. 
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Even though graphs, like numbers, can be used to tell lies I believe that 
what these observations suggest, and what much of the world would like 
to say to Japan, can be expressed by the three-dimensional figure in 
Exhibit 10. The vertical axis represents the gains from trade, the 
additional welfare to be gained from engaging in international 
commerce. The axis pointing into the background is a measure of 
international competitiveness, while the third axis is a measure of 
openness. 
Country A experiences the lowest gains from trade because it is neither 
competitive nor open. Country B, which is similar to Japan, is highly 
competitive but fails to enjoy the fruits of its investment and labor as 
these benefits "leak" away, because for one reason or another imports 
do not rise sufficiently. Country C is highest on the welfare curve 
because it has a better mix of openness and competitiveness. 
Making Japan's Trade A Plus-Sum Game Again 
From the above considerations, it is clear that a key question for Japan 
at present is how to break out of the lose-lose cycle of yen appreciation 
and deflation. Some of the answers include: 
• Stepped up efforts to expand imports into Japan. Japan 
has a long history of stating flatly that its markets are open, then 
preparing lists of new market opening measures. The publications of the 
American Chamber of Commerce in Japan cited above are an objective 
and reliable source of information on remaining barriers. Japanese 
government reports purporting to show that the United States is a closed 
market are red herrings intended to confuse the issue. Expansion of 
imports will be a difficult road that Japan should have begun decades 
ago. Many of the barriers to be overcome are political rather than 
economic. What promises have been made to bureaucrats about future 
positions in industry and other benefits and numerous other behind-the-
scenes issues are among the real impediments to opening the Japanese 
market. 
• Changes in corporate strategy. Long-term data on 
productivity and wages provide a telling picture of one of the key issues 
in the management of the Japanese economy. From 1953 through 1991, 
productivity in the manufacturing sector, as measured by real output per 
employee, has increased roughly 9.76 times. On the other hand, wages, 
adjusted for inflation, have increased 4.32 times13.This should come as 
no surprise to those who are accustomed to hearing that Japan has 
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Exhibit 10: Gains from Trade, Competitiveness, and Openness 
stressed production more than consumption in the interest of long-term 
growth. But one of today's central questions in Japan is whether this 
approach is appropriate in a nation with a mature economy the size of 
Japan's. 
Given what been has said so far, it seems reasonable to raise the 
question of whether a better balance in corporate management 
strategies is needed. In the past, maximum emphasis has been placed 
on expanding market share and driving down costs to remain 
competitive. But if efforts to increase productivity are destined to lead to 
further yen appreciation, then rather than allow this effort to be offset by 
a stronger yen, refocusing strategies to sell a lower volume of higher-
value-added products in overseas markets and refocusing attention on 
the domestic market might lead to a more profitable outcome. This in 
turn would allow higher rewards for shareholders and employees 
(employees also being consumers). Certain companies have actually 
begun to adopt this strategy for some products. This behavior, however, 
goes very much against the grain of Japanese managements who 
expect consumers (again, employees) to wait for their rewards. 
• A surcharge on exports. Given the probable difficulty of 
persuading corporations to raise their prices and accept lower shares in 
overseas markets, another alternative would be to put a surcharge on 
exports, which would effectively raise export prices. The proceeds could 
be used to fund a further reduction in income taxes or fund increased 
public works spending. If the price elasticity of demand for Japanese 
exports as a whole is less than one in the price range covered by the 
tariff, this would imply an increase in export revenues rather than a 
decrease. This would place additional upward pressure on the yen, 
suggesting that the tariff should be even higher. If successful, export 
surcharges might stabilize or reduce the value of the yen, thereby 
increasing at least the unit profitability of exports. 
Measures for the United States to Adopt 
If Japan were to introduce any of the above three measures or take any 
other steps to move closer to a win-win scenario for yen appreciation, 
one of the principal causes of friction between the two nations would be 
removed. 
But needless to say the solution to the problem of putting U.S.-Japan 
economic relations on a firmer footing does not rest entirely with Japan. 
One of the most important issues the United States must deal with is 
generating a greater willingness by U.S. corporations to invest in Japan. I 
use "invest" in a broad sense to include training staff who can do 
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business efficiently in Japan, monitoring the activities of Japanese 
competitors and generating other basic information, building sales and 
service networks, and, where appropriate, locating manufacturing 
facilities in Japan. 
Exhibit 11 shows the huge imbalance between Japan's outgoing direct 
investments and the direct investments of foreign companies flowing into 
Japan. U.S. investment into Japan, of course, is a subcategory of the 
latter. This imbalance is symptomatic of the reluctance of U.S. 
companies to invest in the world's second largest economy. Many 
factors have led to this very peculiar state of affairs, some of which have 
been discussed in previous pages. The strengthening of the yen since 
the mid-1980s has tended to further dampen enthusiasm for investment 
in Japan. While the rates of return on investment may be acceptable in 
many industries, initial costs of entry are high, creating the impression of 
higher risk. The unpredictability of government policies—the roving 
patches of "dense fog" noted above—creates further potential 
complications and risks of low return or even losses. 
In a recent interview we conducted with the president of one of Japan's 
leading financial institutions, he stated quite bluntly, "So far as I know, 
there is really only one U.S. company that is pushing for more openness 
in the Japanese insurance market. The returns on insurance here are 
the lowest in the world. Any U.S. manager who put his company's funds 
at risk by making a big investment in Japan should probably be relieved 
of his position." 
Before we draw the conclusion that low profitability is the ultimate 
nontariff barrier and make this the next point to negotiate with Japan, I 
think is it important to stress that an economy the size of Japan's cannot 
be ignored by international corporations. But the problem is that it is 
being ignored as more and more U.S. and other companies skip over 
Japan and invest in Asia. 
Contrary to the comments of the financial company president above, 
investing in Japan in the broad sense is essential to putting U.S.-Japan 
economic relations on a sounder footing. My first assignment as a 
consultant in Tokyo 25 years ago was to participate in a major study of 
the Japanese market for forestry and paper products. The client devoted 
substantial resources to the project, commissioning us to examine each 
major market in detail. The project included preparing a review of the 
size and growth of key market segments, demand forecasts, an analysis 
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Exhibit 11: Direct Investment Flows 
of major qualitative trends including the impact of emerging 
technologies, and an analysis of customers and competitors as well as 
formulating strategic recommendations. Based on this research, the 
client made a major strategic commitment to the Japanese market and 
today derives a substantial share of its worldwide profit from its activities 
in Japan. 
Almost immediately after completing this project, we were approached 
by one of the top foreign automobile manufacturers to do a "quick and 
dirty" study that would confirm or deny their belief that the small volume 
of exports to Japan was all they could continue to expect in this market. 
The budget was unbelievably small even in those days. Our conclusion 
was that further investment would probably lead to expanded sales. 
Shortly thereafter, the personnel in charge of the study were recalled to 
the United States and the case was closed. That company has only 
recently begun to expand its position in Japan, after being battered for 
years in its home market by competition from Japan and Japanese 
transplants. 
When we say "investing in Japan" some businesspeople think mainly of 
building factories, hiring labor to operate the machinery, and massive 
commitments of management time and financial resources. For some 
companies this may well be appropriate. But "investing" should also 
mean making a careful initial study of the market to determine what level 
of commitment is appropriate. The key questions that should be 
addressed are Will a commitment to Japan add to corporate profits? 
What level of commitment is appropriate? Should we monitor the 
Japanese market for our product and be ready when an opportunity 
emerges? Should we make arrangements with importers and 
distributors to sell our product to Japan? Should we set up our own sales 
and service capability in Japan? Should we work toward ultimately 
having a manufacturing facility in Japan? 
As these questions suggest, the principal factors for success are 
assessing the size of the opportunity and making the right level of 
commitment, based on an appropriately detailed feasibility study. A step 
in the investment process, for example, should be a thorough analysis 
and investigation of the market's potential and where a company might 
fit into the market. Another step would be monitoring developments, 
which is essential to keep companies alert and able to compete with 
Japanese companies not only in Japan but also in other markets. A third 
step may be making initial entry into the market, including organizing a 
distribution network; it could also be opening an R&D facility to provide 
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development support for a sales effort in Japan. 
A few of the other success factors include: 
• Taking a close look at product suitability. Many products and 
services are suited to Japanese tastes and requirements without 
modification. Others need to be adapted. 
• Choosing the mode of distribution and distributors carefully. Do 
not limit your examination of options to existing modes of distribution 
since practices are undergoing considerable change. Also do not 
overlook smaller businesses as tie-up partners and distributors. 
• Setting realistic targets for sales and profits that management 
both in Japan and in the home country can agree upon. 
• Managing results from a long-term perspective. Review progress 
periodically and make adjustments in strategy to meet changing market 
conditions. 
• Avoiding abrupt changes in product, distribution, and other 
policies and work steadily toward building the confidence of customers. It 
takes time to become a qualified vendor. But if major changes must be 
made, considerable care should be taken in communicating the true 
intent of these to customers and the trade press. 
• Being ready to meet quality standards. Examine how Japanese 
companies compete on quality. Keep promises and meet delivery 
schedules. 
• Being responsive in remedying any problems that arise; 
formulate specific policies for correcting them and present these to your 
customers. 
• Constantly monitoring competitors' products and work to improve 
your own. 
Even though some may argue that it is too late or too complicated to 
enter the Japanese market, drawing this conclusion would be a mistake 
for most companies. Japan is the second largest single-nation economy. 
New consumer markets are appearing and existing ones are undergoing 
substantial change. In fact, so much is taking place in Japan in product 
development, technology, and manufacturing techniques that many 
companies worldwide are finding it essential to have some kind of 
presence here. Ignoring the Japanese market may close off important 
sources of ideas, stimulation, and profits that might contribute to a 
company's future growth. 
As a place to invest, Japan is also attractive at present for many other 
reasons. These include lower real estate costs compared with the late 
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1980s; a growing ease of recruiting staff because of reduced hirings by 
Japanese companies and increased intercompany mobility; the 
availability of financing as Japanese banks seek to improve the quality of 
their lending portfolios; and the greater openness of the market. 
While continuing to negotiate with Japan for greater market openness, 
the U.S. government, and U.S. corporations, should examine much more 
carefully the opportunities for exporting to and investing in Japan. 
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Footnotes 
1. New housing starts were running between 1.6 and 1.7 million annually 
from the mid-1980s through 1990, then fell to 1.37 million in 1991. Starts, 
however, had climbed back to nearly 1.5 million in calendar 1993. 
2. The "indexes of operating rate" are prepared by MITI by dividing the 
index of industrial production by the index of production capacity, so an 
assumption is necessary about the rate of utilization of capacity in the 
base year, which in this case is 1990 for both indexes. The actual level of 
industrial output was 100.0 in 1990, but 101.7 in 1991, so utilization rates 
in absolute terms are slightly higher than the figures in Exhibit 5 would 
indicate. 
3. The actual figures for the last quarter of calendar 1993 were as 
follows: Total GNE at 1985 prices: ¥419,257 billion; net exports of goods 
and services: ¥939 billion; exports: ¥60,766 billion; imports: ¥59,827 
billion. 
4. The most recent data, for February 1994, show utilization rate indices 
ranging from a low of 66.4 for general machinery to 104.1 for oil and coal 
products. Industries with index figures near or over 90 include 
nonferrous metals, precision machinery, pottery and glass, pulp and 
paper, and textile products. 
5. A comparison of capital goods prices in Japan versus the U.S. is not 
readily available, but the gap is believed to be smaller than for consumer 
goods. 
6. Sources for Exhibit 7 are as follows: 
Yen-dollar rate: Toyo Keizai, Inc. 
Discount rate: Bank of Japan 
Money supply: Bank of Japan 
GNP growth rates: Economic Planning Agency 
Growth in lending: Bank of Japan 
7. The scale in the Growth in Bank Lending graph does not perhaps 
sufficiently highlight the year-over-year changes in total bank lending. 
The actual figures are as follows: 
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9. For example: Japanese Banks: Paying for Profligacy, James Capel 
10. The Cooperative Loan Purchasing Corporation is an institution set up 
and funded by the banks themselves with the aim of removing some of 
the worst problem loans from their balance sheets. To date, nearly ¥4 
trillion in loans have been sold to this corporation and less than ¥30 
billion recovered. 
11. One of the regulatory practices slowing the writeoffs of bad loans is 
that MOF will not permit banks to run losses. 
12. Sources for Exhibit 8 are as follows: 
Yen-dollar rate: Toyo Keizai, Inc. 
Growth in IMF exports and imports: Bank of Japan 
Trade and current account balances: Bank of Japan 
Capital flows: Bank of Japan 
13. Monthly wages in manufacturing were ¥15,322 in 1953 and rose to 
¥368,594 in 1991. The consumer price index, 1990=100, rose from 
0.186 to 1.033 over this interval. Real wages therefore expanded from 
¥82,376 to ¥356,254, or 4.32 times. 
The index of industrial production rose from 6.4 (1990=100) to 101.7, 
while the total working population rose from 39.13 million to 63.69 million. 
Adjusted for the size of the total work force, the index rose from 1.63 to 
15.96, or 9.76 times. This calculation assumes the percentage of 
manufacturing workers was stable as a percentage of the employed 
population. Since this percentage has probably declined, the 9.76 figure 
is lower than the actual increase in the industrial sector, implying an even 
larger gap between growth in real output and real wages. 
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